EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DELEGATION
TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
- Secretariat -

Summary of individual contributions
from Members of the Convention

CONTENTS

1. CONSTITUTION 2
1.1 General discussion 2
1.2 Explicit plans for a constitution 2
1.3 `Constitutional treaty' 3
2. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 3
3. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE UNION 34
4. OBJECTIVES OF THE UNION 4
5. COMPETENCES 45
5.1 Method of division of competences 45
5.2 Supervision of respect for the principle of subsidiarity and
the division of
competences 67
5.3 Competences to be expanded 79
5.4 Need to review, and possibly renationalise, certain areas
810
5.5 Different intensities of Community action in different areas
911
5.6 Possible changes to the different competences 911
- Economic government and social policy 911
- CFSP/EDSP 102
- Justice and home affairs 103
- Financing of the Union 114
6. NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 152
6.1 General strengthening of the role of national parliaments in
the decision-making
mechanism 125
6.2 Chamber appointed by the national parliaments 125
6.3 Increasing control exercised by national parliaments over
their governments 136
7. REGIONS 174
8. CIVIL SOCIETY 174
9. ENHANCED COOPERATION 184
10. INSTITUTIONS 185
10.1 Presidency 185
10.2 European Parliament 195
10.3 Council 1620
10.4 Commission 217
10.5 Court of Justice 1822
10.6 Divers 22
11. INSTRUMENTS 1822
11.1 Hierarchy of norms 1823
11.2 Typology of instruments 1923
12. SIMPLIFICATION 1924
13. ORGANISATION OF THE CONVENTION'S BUSINESS 1924
13.1 Duration of the Convention's work 1924
13.2 Information - communication with citizens 1924
13.3 Applicant states 1924
13.4 Working groups 1924

1. Constitution

1.1 General discussion
- HAENEL discusses, first of all, the `constitutional
ambitions' expressed by some and calls for a degree of caution. The
idea of a `Constitution of the EU' first needs to be clarified. Do
we mean the type of constitution which exists in federal states
(e.g. United States or Germany), i.e., a text serving as a framework
for the exercise of sovereignty, produced by a constituent power and
which could evolve without requiring the unanimous endorsement of
members of the Federation? A constitutional treaty? A fundamental
treaty? In any case, those who advocate a constitution in the strict
sense should be aware of the risk of weakening the definition of
common policies or undermining certain rules which are fundamental
to the European institutional balance (e.g. withdrawal of the EP's
right of initiative), whose continued existence would be threatened
by a democratic constitution.
- BERÈS-HÄNSCH point out that the opening of a
constitutional process can only be meaningful if considered as a
further step in the integration process and supported by the peoples
of the various Member States.

1.2 Explicit plans for a constitution
- DUFF , who actually proposes a number of articles for the
constitution (while also referring to the concept of a
Constitutional Treaty).
- CARNERO GONZALEZ (who focuses on the financing of the
Union).
- IDRAC (who would nevertheless accept a constitutional
treaty).
- In a joint contribution, DUFF-LAMASSOURE-DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-
KAUFMANN-ZIELENIEC-BERÈS40 call for a statement in the Constitution
that the constitutional prerogatives of the Member States shall
apply except where they are inconsistent with the Constitution of
the Union.
- IOAKIMIDIS calls for a basic text based on the work of the
EUI (Florenc).

1.3 `Constitutional Treaty'
- Contribution from NAHTIGAL .
- Contribution from TEUFEL , who puts forward a complete
structure for the proposed Constitutional Treaty.
- Contribution from SEVERIN .
- Contribution from TRZCINSKI , who refers to the essential
elements to be included (fundamental rights, structure of powers,
competences, legal situation of the Member States);
- Contribution from MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO .
- Contribution de BERGER41, co-signée par AVGERINOS-DI RUPO-
DUHAMEL-EINEM-FAYOT-GABER-KAUFMANN-KAVAN-VAN LANCKER-BADINTER-BERES-
CARNERO GONZALEZ-KOHNT-LICHTENBERGER-NAGY-PACIOTTI-SEVERIN41,
demandant qu'un projet de Traité constitutionnel inspiré par le
texte de l'Institut de Florence soit préparé par la Commission.
Cette position en faveur d'un traité constitutionnel inspiré du
texte de l'Institut de Florence dont la première partie ne pourrait
être révisée qu'après avis conforme du PE et ratification par les
Parlements nationaux se retrouve dans la contribution des
socialistes du PE48.
- Contribution d'ANDRIUKAITIS42 qui avance une proposition de
structure du Traité constiutionnel, qui contiendrait les
dispositions institutionnelles essentielles tandis que la
législation primaire figurant actuellement dans les Traités serait
renvoyée à des lois organiques. Cette contribution pose par ailleurs
la question de la ratification (référendum pan-européen?) du Traité
constitionnel.

2. Charter of Fundamental Rights

- The Charter should be included in the final text, according
to NAHTIGAL 7, TEUFEL 8 (who also mentions the alternative
possibility of simply referring to the Charter in the Constitutional
Treaty), TRZCINSKI 10, IDRAC 5, BERÈS-HÄNSCH 2 (position reprise
dans une contribution co-signée par l'ensemble de la délégation
socialiste du Parlement européen), MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11, VAN
LANCKER , ATTALIDES , KAVAN , and IOAKIMIDIS 6 and SEVERIN9.
- DUFF 3 opts for the Charter to be referred to in an article
on citizenship and incorporated into the Treaties in the form of a
protocol.
- BRUTON , on the contrary, is against this idea, preferring
EU accession to the ECHR.
- SEVERIN9 calls for the ECHR to be included in the
Constitutional Treaty in addition to the Charter.

3. Legal personality of the Union

- Recognition of the Union's legal personality is advocated by
TEUFEL 8, TIILIKAINEN , DUFF 3, and IOAKIMIDIS 6, SEVERIN9,
LAMASSOURE-DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-KAUFMANN-ZIELENIEC-BERÉS40, EINEM32,
ANDRIUKAITIS42 et la contribution des socialistes du PE48.

4. Objectives of the Union

- HAENEL 1, considers that a hierarchy of such objectives must
be carefully established.
- HÜBNER , considers that they should not be of an
exclusively economic nature.
- La délégation socialiste du PE48 estime qu'ils doivent être
réécrits pour être adaptés et rééquilibrés (harmonisation fiscale,
définition des standards sociaux).
- DUFF 3, believes that they should be to `promote social and
economic progress, establish an area of freedom, security and
justice, enhance the environment of Europe and the world, secure and
defend the Union'.
- HJELM-WALLEN , believes that they should be to `promote
international peace, security and development, achieve sustainable
development and develop the EU into an area of freedom, security and
justice'.
- IDRAC 5 considers that the initial objective of
achieving 'an ever-closer union' should first be verified and
reaffirmed in the light of the convergence which now exists on the
following objectives: peace, internal security, economic prosperity
and sustainable development, promotion of individual freedoms and
social rights, interregional cohesion, diversity of cultural
identities and development of a world based on greater solidarity.
- MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11 consider that the Union's tasks
should be updated and grouped together in a Constitutional Treaty.

5. Competences

5.1 Method of division of competences
- HAENEL 1 considers that an approach by block of competences
(Community exclusive competences/Member States' exclusive
competences) would not be appropriate.
- TEUFEL 8 proposes, instead, listing the Union's competences
and distinguishing between `exclusive', `fundamental'
and `subsidiary' competences. There should, at the same time, be a
definition of those areas in which the Member States have sole
competence.
- FARNLEITNER calls for a clear statement in the Treaties
that the competence for deciding on competences belongs to the
Member States and that the Union only has exclusive powers where
these are explicitly stated in the Treaties. Competences should be
divided into "Exclusive competences of the Union, Shared competences
of the Union and the Member States and Competences of the Member
States". All areas where the Union has exclusive competence should
be explicitly stated in the Treaty. A non-exhaustive list of
exclusive competences for the Member States should also be
explicitly stated in the Treaty. It should also be explicitly stated
in the Treaty that all competences not mentioned belong to the
Member States.
- HJELM WALLÉN 18 and IOAKIMIDIS 6 explicitly reject the idea
of a strict catalogue of competences and considers that the current
method, under which competences result from the objectives assigned
to the Union, should be preserved, even though some of the
objectives may need to be modernised. The contribution therefore
sets out various criteria for determining which tasks should be
assigned as a priority to the EU (transnational nature of the
subject, risk of prejudice being caused to all in the event of
isolated national action or absence of European action or advantages
of European measures over national action).
- TIILIKAINEN 16, and NAHTIGAL 7 and ANDRIUKAITIS42 also
explicitly reject the idea of establishing a catalogue of
competences, as does IOAKIMIDIS 6, who also calls for solidarity to
coexist with subsidiarity as the guiding principle for allocating
competences; IDRAC 5 points out that it would be wrong to expect a
clarification of the Union's tasks to entail a very detailed
definition of sub-areas of competence of the Union on the one hand,
and of the Member States on the other, based on specific examples.
GLOTZ-HAIN-HÜBNER-McSHARRY-MOSCOVICI (in a joint contribution
advocating the inclusion in the Treaty of the principle that any
field in which the Union has no competence remains a matter solely
for the Member States) also oppose the drawing-up of a catalogue of
competences; PALACIO considers that a list system would make it
practically impossible for the Community to adopt any instrument
proposing to deal with the various legal aspects of a given problem,
such as the directive on e-commerce. She takes the view that the
real debate principally concerns the objectives of the Community.
- BRUTON 15 believes that a more balanced approach would be to
list categories of competences; MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11 take a
similar approach and suggest various criteria on which to base the
allocation of a competence to the Union (to avoid the possible
adverse effects of action taken at national level where the area
affected by the action goes beyond the national boundaries; where
action at Union level would have a comparative advantage in terms of
effectiveness or resources; need for cohesion and solidarity).
- WUERMELING considers that the Lamassoure report should be
taken as a basis and suggests that a screening be performed by the
Christophersen working group in order to check whether adjustments
to the Treaties are necessary.
- DINI believes that it is not so much a question of
defining the respective areas of competence of the Union and the
Member States, as of determining their respective spheres of action
within concurrent competences; he also believes that a system in
which competences may be added or withdrawn is essential and that
significant progress has been possible under Article 308. He
suggests an improved formula of this type (unanimity of governments,
assent of the European Parliament and approval of national
parliaments).
- TIILIKAINEN 16 similarly, considers that both Article 95 and
Article 308 have been sources of dynamism, which should not be
undermined; MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO11, who also refer to Article 94,
take a similar view, but accept that provision may need to be made
for guarantees to avoid misinterpretations of the Union's
competences.
- BÖSCH , on the other hand, is in favour of removing Article
308. In a joint contribution, GLOTZ-HAIN-HÜBNER-McSHARRY-MOSCOVICI
20 on the other hand express the view that it could be retained so
that it could also be taken as a basis for returning competences
from the Union in fields where it is no longer necessary for the
latter to act. In a joint reply DUFF-LAMASSOURE-DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-
KAUFMANN-ZIELENIEC-BERÉS40 argue that Art. 308 does not give the
Union the power of general competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Only a
Treaty amendment can redistribute competences. The scope of Art. 308
could be broadened by removing the constraint of the Common Market
and ensuring that measures could be dropped when the objective has
been attained.
- FARNLEITNER 19 considers that Articles 95 and 308 should be
kept but should define more precisely which areas they apply to
(e.g. Article 95 should only apply to the realisation of the Common
Market). Article 308 should involve the EP, Committee of the Regions
and ESC.
- Other members of the Convention insist that Article 308
should be kept: BASILE .

5.2 Supervision of respect for the principle of subsidiarity and
the division of competences
- PALACIO 21 stresses at the outset that the present system
does not lack safeguards, as demonstrated particularly by experience
of the directive on anti-tobacco advertising.
- FARNLEITNER 19 calls for an ex-ante mechanism (within the
ECJ) similar to that in Article 300, paragraph 6 of the EC Treaty.
National parliaments, the Committee of the Regions and regions with
legislative powers should have access to this mechanism, which
should also apply to Articles 96 and 308.
- TIILIKAINEN16 notes that most of the arguments put forward
in this debate place the emphasis on a political mechanism (prior to
final adoption of an act).
- La contribution des des socialistes du PE48 estime que
l'application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionalité
doit être renforcée d'abord dans le cadre du contrôle par les
Parlements nationaux de l'action de leur gouvernement au Conseil,
ainsi que, ex ante, par un contrôle politique et, ex post, par la
CJCE.
- HAIN too considers that the monitoring of subsidiarity
should take place before a legal text is tabled.
- HAENEL 1 believes that a specific body (second chamber,
appointed by the national parliaments) should be responsible for
monitoring compliance with the subsidiarity principle.
- In a joint contribution, GLOTZ-HAIN-HÜBNER-McSHARRY-
MOSCOVICI 20 state that this monitoring should be performed by a
political body collectively representing national parliaments, but
also suggest an alternative in the form of a body mandated by the
Council (they do not give details of this). In a joint reply DUFF-
LAMASSOURE-DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-KAUFMANN-ZIELENIEC-BERÉS40 refute the
need for such a body - policing subsidiarity will be dramatically
easier when the legislating Council meets openly.
- TEUFEL 8 proposes setting up an EP/national
parliaments `joint committee' responsible for this supervision.
- BÖSCH 24 considers that a court of competences, made up of
members of the national constitutional courts, should be set up.
- Une contribution co-signée par de nombreux conventionnels
(BROK-SANTER-VAN DER LINDEN-WUERMELING-ALTMAIER-AZEVEDO-BASILE-
DEMETRIOU-DU GRANRUT-FOGLER-KOCAOGLU-KORHONEN-LAMASSOURE-MAIJ-WEGGEN-
PETERLE-RACK-SPRINDZUKS-TAJANI-TEUFEL-WITTBRODT43) defend le
caractére juridictionnel et ex post du contrôle de l'application du
principe de subsidiarité, dans le cadre d'une chambre spécialisée de
la Cour de Justice. Le contrôle juridictionnel pourrait toutefois
être complété d'un contrôle préalable à l'entrée en vigueur de
l'acte, initié au niveau politique, limité aux conflits de
compétences et au non-respect des principes de subsidiarité et de
proportionalité, contrôle qui, toutefois, resterait de nature
juridictionnelle. ANDRIUKAITIS42, envisageant la mise en place d'un
comité de la subsidiarité et de la proportionalité, semble aller
aussi dans ce sens.
- BASILE 25 also proposes judicial supervision, to be
performed by a special chamber of the Court of Justice.
- TIILIKAINEN notes that most of the arguments put forward in
this debate place the emphasis on a political mechanism (prior to
final adoption of an act).
- DINI 23 considers that, while the Court of Justice should in
any case always have the final say in the supervision of the
division of competences, consideration might be given to setting up
a joint committee, with the involvement of the Member States,
responsible for giving a preliminary ruling.
- BRUTON 15 suggests that the European Council could be
appealed to, on the basis of a petition signed by at least 40% of
Members of the national parliaments of at least one quarter of the
Member States.
- IDRAC 5 believes that supervision of subsidiarity should be
both political and judicial: in this connection, the proposal for a
specialised ECJ chamber should be considered more closely.
- BARRAU considers that a means of appeal to the ECJ, open
to the EU institutions or to a quarter of the members of the
Congress, representing at least six Member States, must be
established upstream of the legislative process, with a time limit
of one month from submission of a proposal; this would,
incidentally, be without prejudice to the possibility of a
subsequent action before the ECJ, by way of exception.
- DE GUCHT44 envisage une alternative sous forme de mécanisme
d'alarm, permettant à une majorité des Parlements nationaux
d'obtenir une deuxième lecture, à l'issue de laquelle la procédure
d'adoption de l'acte contesté ne pourrait que dans des conditions de
majorité renforcée au Conseil et au Parlement.

5.3 Competences to be expanded

- DUFF 3 mentions, as the EU's `principal'
competences, trade policy, the customs union, environmental issues
affecting more than one Member State and the CFSP/ESDP.
- Social policy, which should form the subject of a
European Social Treaty, and economic government,
according to BARRAU 27.
- Telecommunications, postal services, energy, financial
services, environmental protection and some aspects of pensions
(transfer of entitlements), according to NAHTIGAL 7.
- IDRAC 5 lists, in addition to the CFSP and the economic and
social sector, 'cross-border' issues, such as the fight against
organised crime, immigration, asylum, environment, health,
international energy and transport networks.
- Environment, immigration and taxation, according to
IOAKIMIDIS 6.
- Food safety, according to TIILIKAINEN 16 and IOAKIMIDIS 6.
- Sports, according to DUHAMEL .
- La contribution des socialistes du PE48, sans se positionner
par rapport au problème de la répartition des compétences, plaide
pour l'approfondissement et la diversification des politiques
complémentaires (jeunesse, sports, infomation, culture).
- Citizenship, according to HÜBNER 17, BARRAU 27, TEUFEL 8,
and IOAKIMIDIS 6 and SEVERIN9, who wishes to see `social
citizenship'.
- The protection of national/cultural minorities should be
dealt with at European level, according to SEVERIN9.
- The CFSP, according to TEUFEL 8, HJELM WALLÉN 18, BASILE 25,
IOAKIMIDIS 6 and NAHTIGAL 7 (in this connection, there are many
comments seeking to abolish the pillars: TEUFEL , SEVERIN and
MARTONYI . IOAKIMIDIS calls for the consolidation of all 3 pillars
into a single Community pillar. BÖSCH , on the other hand, considers
that unanimity and intergovernmental cooperation must continue to
apply to the CFSP and JHA).
- JHA, according to TEUFEL 8, HJELM WALLÉN 18, TIILIKAINEN 16
(combating terrorism) and NAHTIGAL 7 (checks at external borders,
combating organised crime and protection of minorities), BASILE 25
(combating terrorism, criminal organisations, economic crime and
crimes against public administration), KAVAN 14 (also everyday
violent crime) and ATTALIDES 13.
- The protection of national/cultural minorities should be
dealt with at European level, according to SEVERIN .
- Regarding CFSP and JHA, calls for abolition of the three
pillars: BERGER38, TEUFEL8, SEVERIN9, MARTONYI , IOAKIMIDIS6, DUFF-
LAMASSOURE-DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-KAUFMANN-ZIELENIEC-BERÈS40 et la
contribution des socialistes du PE48. BÖSCH24, on the other hand,
considers that unanimity and intergovernmental cooperation must
continue to apply to the CFSP and JHA.

5.4 Need to review, and possibly renationalise, certain areas:

- HJELM WALLÉN 18 merely refers to the need to modernise the
objectives of the agricultural policy and update those of regional
and structural policies.
- BÖSCH 24, on the other hand, clearly supports the transfer
of agriculture back to the Member States and clearly rejects the
Communitarisation of the second and third pillars. JHA policy areas
in the first pillar should be returned to the third pillar and dealt
with by a new JHA Council, chaired by the General Secretary.
- WUERMELING 22 rejects `renationalisation' but states that
the possibility of a realignment of the Union's activities should
not be excluded.
- NAHTIGAL 7 states that renationalising these policies would
be pointless, but considers that they should be redefined (and in
particular that the Member States should have their hands free as
regards the distribution of Community funds).

5.5 Different intensities of Community action in different areas:

- HJELM WALLÉN 18 points out that, while the traditional
Community method and harmonisation remain necessary in key areas,
the open cooperation method would be more appropriate in others
(common objectives but more latitude for their achievement).
- NAHTIGAL 7 advocates developing mutual supervision and open
coordination methods (which presupposes an impartial Commission,
enhanced democratic control of policies on economic affairs, social
protection and the fight against exclusion and unemployment).
- DINI 23 notes that the current treaty already provides for
varying degrees of intensity of Community action by using different
terms such as `common
policies', `policies', `measures', `incentives', `promotion', `contri
bution', and suggests that their use be rationalised according to
the matters concerned.
- MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11 emphasise the fact that the
relationship between competences and instruments should not be
rigid. The intensity of EU competence in relation to that of the
Member States depends on the political objectives being pursued; the
choice of one type of instrument rather than another is in no way
dependent on the category of competence.
- HAIN 26 points out that linking different methods of
cooperation to different decision-making processes (QMV, unanimity)
and different levels of competence (exclusive, shared/
complementary, national) is useful but must not restrict flexibility.

5.6 Possible changes to the different competences

¨ Economic government and social policy

- BARRAU 27 mentions tax harmonisation and proposes making
reference to ten major aspects of the European social model.
- BRUTON 15 suggests distinguishing between various growth
scenarios in the context of the Stability Pact; IDRAC 5 and
IOAKIMIDIS 6 argue in favour of tax harmonisation and the definition
of social standards capable of preventing social dumping.
- VAN LANCKER 12 produces a substantial contribution on
economic and social government based on the belief that the Charter
must be incorporated, the Convention acceded to and social
objectives promoted in the Treaty. She calls for codecision and QMV
on social and fiscal policy, proposes that broad outlines of
economic and employment policy be drawn up each year, the open
method of coordination be enshrined in the Treaty and a tripartite
committee be set up for consultation on social issues with a view to
growth, employment and social cohesion, and a bipartite European
Labour Council. Ces différents points se retrouvent, dans leurs
grandes lignes, dans une contribution ultérieure co-signée par
l'ensemble de la délégation socialiste du Parlement européen.
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 calls for the coordination of monetary and
fiscal policy and the representation of the Eurozone in external
relations by the Commission.
- KAUFMANN49 défend dans une contribution trés détaillée
l'ambition "d'un traité constitutionnel pour une Europe sociale",
dans lequel serait revu l'ensemble des dispositions intéressant
l'Union monétaire, la politique financière et budgétaire, la
politique sociale et la politique de l'environnement, de manière à
faire une plus large place aux objectifs de plein emploi et de
développement durable, et à élargir la compétence communautaire.

¨ CFSP/EDSP

- HJELM WALLÉN 18 considers that coordination with development
policy, trade policy and immigration and asylum policies should be
improved (increased use of the Community method).
- NAHTIGAL 7, BRUTON 15 and IOAKIMIDIS 6 are in favour of
amalgamating the Commissioner for External Relations (Vice-President
of the Commission) with the High Representative and, more generally,
partial and gradual Communitisation of the CFSP (QM voting,
MS/Commission/High Representative shared initiative during a
transitional period), while military affairs should continue to be
governed by intergovernmental cooperation. HAMCIK45 prend une
position très proche (bien que n'envisageant la fusion des fonctions
de haut représentant et de vice-président de la Commission en charge
des relations extérieures qu'à long terme).
- La contribution des socialistes du PE48 plaide pour
incorporation, en tant que commissaire à statut spécial choisi par
le Président de la Commission et le Conseil, du Haut Représentant
dans la Commission.
- EINEM32 va encore plus loin dans le sens de la
communautarisation, insistant sur la reconnaissance explicite de la
personnalité juridique à l'Union, l'attribution à la Commission de
la responsabilité exclusive pour négocier au niveau international
(le Haut représentant devant être intégré comme vice-président à la
Commission), le vote à la majorité qualifiée, une association
appropriée du Parlement européen au processus de décision et la
representation de l'Union en tant que telle dans les instances
internationales.
- FARNLEITNER19 défend la communautarisation de l'ensemble de
l'action extérieure de l'Union (sauf aspects militaires) de manière
similaire (y compris l'inclusion dans le budget communautaire du
Fonds européen de développement).
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 calls for enhanced authority of the High
Representative to initiate regular European Defence Councils. The
Petersberg Tasks must be associated with a more fully developed
economic foreign policy (including development policy) and
environmental policy. Common Defence Policy must become
a "collective security system" which complements NATO, and the EU
should acquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
- IDRAC 5 suggests that the foreign and defence policy be
incorporated into the Community sphere in stages: during a
transitional stage, specific rules on powers of initiative, voting
procedures and the participation of Member States in international
organisations would be maintained; specific steps towards enhanced
integration would be defined. An overall strategic doctrine should
be established. A European arms agency would be a useful instrument.
- LAMASSOURE proposes a very detailed phased plan for the
Communitisation of the CFSP, on a somewhat similar model to the
process of establishment of Economic and Monetary Union.
- DINI 23 approaches the question of the CFSP from the point
of view of improving the effectiveness of the existing instruments
in this field (see `instruments').
- SEVERIN9 calls for the integration of migration policies
into the CFSP.
- La contribution des socialistes du PE48 estime que le
renforcement de l'Union dans le monde exige l'élimination du doublon
actuel entre le Conseil et la Commission, la ratification par le PE
de tous les accords internationaux d'importancee, et le recours le
plus souvent possible au VMQ (et en tout cas pour toutes les
décisions de politique commerciale). En ce qui concerne la PESD, il
s'agit, à la condition d'un contrôle renforcé du PE dans ce domaine,
de mettre en oeuvre les missions de Petersberg et, si possible, de
doter l'Union d'une force opérationnelle rapidement mobilisable.

¨ Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)

- TEUFEL 8, IOAKIMIDIS 6, KAVAN 14, and BRUTON 15 and SEVERIN9
emphasise, in particular, EUROPOL's operational powers and the
development of a European border police force; KAVAN 14 and SEVERIN9
points out that these operational powers should be subject to
judicial control; la contribution des socialistes du PE48 relie la
question du statut d'EUROPOL à celle du statut d'EUROJUST, qui
doivent être mis en cohérence; BÖSCH 24 calls for coordination in
Europol to be intensified, but is against giving Europol operational
powers.
- BRUTON 15 also calls for a common immigration policy,
covering such issues as the right to work, social benefits and
freedom of movement in the Union; KAVAN 14 and SEVERIN9 calls for
harmonisation of asylum and immigration policy, which should be
interconnected with employment policy and the protection of basic
rights and freedoms. `Framework Decisions' should become Directives
where the Commission has the right of initiative.
- HJELM WALLÉN 18 proposes establishing a European public
prosecutor under the first pillar for certain crimes; la
contribution des socialistes du PE48 défend quant à elle la création
d'un paquet européen habilité à poursuivre les fraudes à l'encontre
des intérêts financièrs de l'Union; IDRAC 5 proposes, in addition to
a European public prosecutor's office, a criminal law harmonisation
policy.
- SEVERIN9 calls for a system of European Courts at European,
regional and national level and the automatic recognition of
judicial decisions in one Member State by all other Member States.
There should be a European Criminal Court, European Criminal Code
and European General Prosecutor. A common system of investigation,
prosecution and arrestment also.
- CUSHNAHAN calls for an EU Coastguard.

¨ Financing of the Union

- IDRAC 5 considers that a genuine system of own resources
should be reinstated, enabling the European Parliament to intervene
in the establishment of resource levels; MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11
adopt the same position.
- BARRAU 27 and CARNERO GONZALEZ 4 consider that a review of
the current 1.27% ceiling on own resources is essential.
- CARNERO GONZALEZ 4 ainsi que la contribution générale
ultérieure co-signée par l'ensemble de la délégation socialiste du
PE48 also advocates the gradual introduction of a European income
tax; DUFF 3 is in favour of the system of own resources including
the possibility of raising taxes, as part of a funding system
providing for the establishment of a limit (as a percentage of GNP)
on EU expenditure.
- TEUFEL 8 and CARNERO GONZALEZ 4 ainsi que la contribution
générale ultérieure co-signée par l'ensemble de la délégation
socialiste du PE48 argue in favour of abolishing the distinction
between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure.

6. National parliaments (see also `Supervision of respect for the
principle of subsidiarity')

6.1 A general strengthening of the role of national parliaments
in the decision-making mechanism:

- NAHTIGAL 7 calls for a strengthening of the role of the
national parliaments, in particular where the Union is granted new
competences.
- BRUTON 15 puts forward various ideas such as that of
an `advisory note', to be drawn up by each ministry within one
month, on all Commission proposals, as well as Commissioners' video-
conferences and the establishment in each parliament of a European
week set aside for briefings on Europe.
- EINEM suggests introducing an obligation for each
Presidency to report to national parliaments and giving national
parliaments the right to put questions twice a year.
- KILJUNEN-VANHANEN-HELLE-KORHONEN consider it clear, at all
events, that the question of supervision by national parliaments of
European affairs must be dealt with at national level. However, it
could be indicated in the Treaty that ministers participating in the
Council guarantee that appropriate consideration has been given to
matters at national level; accordingly, arrangements ought to be
made for national parliaments to receive full and regular
information as soon as possible.
- ATTALIDES 13 also considers that it is through the operation
of the Council that most contributions by national parliaments to
the functioning of the Council can be made and that supervision
accordingly needs to be improved at national level. However, he
mentions briefings for national parliaments by the Commission and
the Council secretariat, and stepping up exchanges of views within
COSAC.
- ANDRIUKAITIS-KUTRAITE-GIEDRAITIENE46 observent que c'est
surtout à travers leur rôle de mise en oeuvre de la législation que
les Parlements nationaux sont susceptibles de participer à la prise
de décisions, les institutions communautaires devant veiller à leur
préserver un espace à cet égard.

6.2 Chamber appointed by the national parliaments

- HAENEL 1 supports this idea: a second chamber, made up of an
equal number of parliamentarians from each Member State, would have
the advantage of bringing Europe closer to citizens and responding
to the fears of smaller Member States. It would deal essentially
with supervision of the application of subsidiarity and action taken
at European level in the most intergovernmental areas (CFS, JHA);
SEVERIN 9 considers that the second chamber should be part of the
EP: however, it would still be a body made up of representatives of
the Member States, as well as regional and local authorities;
- BRUTON 15, on the other hand, does not consider it
appropriate to set up a new body, and instead advocates conferring a
special role on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
in areas such as the CFSP, human rights and revision of the Treaties.
- EINEM 32 explicitly rejects this idea.
- KILJUNEN-VANHANEN-HELLE-KORHONEN 33 do not see the point of
such a second chamber, considering that what national parliaments
need instead is stronger arrangements for cooperation, which could
make use of COSAC, provided that the European Parliament is
recognised as an equal partner there.
- ANDRIUKAITIS46 défend une position assez proche de la
précédente, en estimant que la COSAC pourrait se voir confier la
tâche d'assurer la légitimité des décisions relevant de la sphère
intergouvernementale ainsi qu'un droit de saisir la Cour.
- BARRAU 27 is against a second chamber, but puts forward the
idea of a Congress of National Parliaments (3/4) and of the European
Parliament (1/4), which would elect the President of the Union, have
the power of initiative, and participate in supervision of
compliance with subsidiarity (cf. 5.2). The Congress would meet
twice a year in Strasbourg and would have a secretariat.
- ATTALIDES 13, DUFF-LAMASSOURE-DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-KAUFMANN-
ZIELENIEC-BERÈS40 likewise considers that it would complicate the
process and rejects the idea. La contribution des socialistes du
PE48 rejette elle aussi explicitement l'idée d'une seconde chambre.
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 rejects a second legislative body of
representatives of national parliaments and calls for enhanced
cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments
and a reform of COSAC.
- BÖSCH 24 and KURZMANN favour the following approach: in
the 1st pillar the Council should function as a First Chamber. This
First Chamber should comprise 2 members per Member State (the Europe
Minister and the relevant policy Minister). Its meetings should be
public. For BÖSCH 24 voting should be according to the procedure
agreed in Nice.

6.3 Increasing control exercised by national parliaments over their
governments

- EINEM 32 considers that it is primarily by means of the
control which they exercise over their governments (possibly by
means of resolutions which are binding on the government) that
national parliaments should enhance their role. ANDRIUKAITIS-
KUTRAITE-GIEDRAITIENE46 vont dans le même sens, en mettant l'accent
sur la nécessaire transparence des travaux du Conseil.
- KREITZBERG-KELAM likewise stress control at national
level, suggesting in this spirit that exchanges of information and
experience should be improved by holding joint meetings of European
affairs committees of national parliaments and establishing direct
contact between political parties and members of the various
parliaments.
- BÖSCH 24 considers that Council Ministers should be bound by
a mandate from their national parliament, as does KURZMANN 34.

7. Regions

- HJELM WALLEN 18 considers that relations between the Member
States and regional or local authorities should continue to be
regulated at national level.
- PALACIO 21 warns of the danger of fostering the development
of `institutional protectionism', with bodies at each level of
competence (national, regional and Community) seeking primarily to
preserve their field of competences or even expand it.
- MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11 suggest that the Member States
provide a list of regions with legislative powers (including the
scope of their competences), which could be given specific
consultative powers.
- According to BÖSCH 24 the Committee of the Regions should be
given equal institutional status with the EP, Council, Commission
and ECJ and that the Committee of the Regions and the Constitutional
Regions should have the right of redress before the ECJ.
- SEVERIN9 calls for "territorial communities" to be
given "collective rights".

8. Civil society

- BERÈS-HÄNSCH 2 stress the importance of developing the
European public area, especially through civil society.
- HAIN 26 suggests improving the consultation of citizens
before legislative proposals are submitted.
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 calls for the dialogue with civil society to be
institutionalised.

9. Enhanced cooperation

- NAHTIGAL 7 considers enhanced cooperation to be essential.
- It is envisaged by TEUFEL 8 and considered natural, in the
context of the expansion of the Union's competences, by BARRAU 27.
- IDRAC 5 mentions a vanguard of Member States prepared to
move more swiftly towards integration.
- BERÈS-HÄNSCH2 believe that the Eurogroup states should
engage in enhanced cooperation, the corollary being that qualified
majority voting and codecision become standard practice in matters
relating to employment policy and action to combat poverty and
exclusion.
- BARRAU 27 takes a similar view.

10. Institutions

10.1 Presidency

- BERÈS-HÄNSCH 2 argue in favour of greater personalisation of
the European Union, with regard to both the President and the Prime
Minister.
- La contribution des socialistes du PE48 plaide pour la
réforme du système de rotation des présidences, et s'oppose à l'idée
d'un directoire exécutif ou d'un président exécutif au sein du
Conseil.
- BARRAU 27 is in favour of a President elected for five
years, initially by a Congress composed of representatives of the
national parliaments and the European Parliament and subsequently by
direct universal suffrage: this President would represent the Union
in external affairs and would preside over the European Council.
- BÖSCH 24 proposes that the Federation of Nation States
should be led by a five-headed Presidium made up of the Troika
according to the present system, the President of the European
Parliament and the President of the Commission.
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 feels there are important arguments for
retaining the six-month Presidency, but suggests as alternatives the
appointment of a President by the Council for 3-5 years or the
delegation of the Presidency to the Secretary-General.

10.2 European Parliament

- TEUFEL 8 considers that the uniform electoral procedure and
full budgetary codecision powers for the EP are key points; BRUTON
15, on the other hand, is totally opposed to any undermining of the
Commission's monopoly on powers of initiative.
- EINEM 32 considers that only if the European Parliament is
given the power of codecision will decisions be legitimate, as
representatives of the various Member States may find themselves in
a minority in the Council.
- La délégation socialiste du PE48 revendique pour le
Parlement européen le rôle de co-législateur, complété par une
procédure de call-back pour la législation secondaire.
- KREITZBERG-KELAM 35, calling for the authority of the
European Parliament to be enhanced, not only advocate codecision as
a general rule in conjunction with QMV but would also like to see
the European Parliament placed on a footing of equality with
national parliaments with regard to revision of the Treaties.
- BRUTON 15 mentions the possibility of a proportional
election covering Europe as a whole.
- HÜBNER 17 and IOAKIMIDIS 6 consider that Parliament's
authority should be strengthened.
- BARRAU 27 and IOAKIMIDIS 6 call for a reform of the
procedure for electing Members of the European Parliament and for
codecision to become standard practice.
- DINI 23, BELOHORSKA-BROK-DUFF-DUHAMEL-GLOTZ-KAUFMANN-
KILJUNEN-VAN DER LINDEN-MIERLO-ROSSA-TIMMERMANS-VASTAGH-AVGERINOS-
DINI-FAYOT-HÄNSCH-LAMASSOURE-MARINHO-SANTER-SZAJER-WITTBRODT-BALAZS-
DE GUCHT-HAMZIK-KAVAN-VAN LANCKER-MEYER-OLEKSY-TEUFEL-KUNEVA-
ALTMAIER-PACIOTTI-SPINI-BERÈS-KAUPPI-NAGY-PLEUGER-BERGER-RACK-SENFF-
WUERMELING expresses theimselvesf clearly in favour of general
codecision (including on budgetary issues) in conjunction with QMV.
- According to BÖSCH 24 and KURZMANN 34 codecision with the EP
as Second Chamber should be the rule in all areas of the 1st pillar.
- KURZMANN 34 calls for codecision in all areas of the first
pillar.
- BERGER38 calls for all legislative acts to be subject to co-
decision - especially in Asylum and Immigration Policy. The final
decision on legislation should fall to the European Parliament and
not the Council. Co-decision should be reformed so that the European
Parliament is involved at a much earlier stage.
- La contribution des socialistes du PE48 revendique pour
celui-ci l'extension de la procédure de co-décision à tous les
domaines législatifs et budgétaires, le pouvoir d'avis conforme pour
les modifications du traité et les nominations d'importance
constitutionnelle, et un droit de regard sur les mesures d'exécution
prises par la Commission.

10.3 Council

- TEUFEL 8 considers that Council decisions should be taken by
a double majority of Member States and population.
- La contribution des socialistes du PE48 défend aussi le
principe de cette double majorité, ainsi que l'extension du VMQ à
toutes les actes du Conseil, sauf en matière constitutionnelle.
- DINI 23, and IOAKIMIDIS 6 and BELOHORSKA-BROK-DUFF-DUHAMEL-
GLOTZ-KAUFMANN-KILJUNEN-VAN DER LINDEN-MIERLO-ROSSA-TIMMERMANS-
VASTAGH-AVGERINOS-DINI-FAYOT-HÄNSCH-LAMASSOURE-MARINHO-SANTER-SZAJER-
WITTBRODT-BALAZS-DE GUCHT-HAMZIK-KAVAN-VAN LANCKER-MEYER-OLEKSY-
TEUFEL-KUNEVA-ALTMAIER-PACIOTTI-SPINI-BERÈS-KAUPPI-NAGY-PLEUGER-
BERGER-RACK-SENFF-WUERMELING36 are in favour of majority decisions
within the Council.
- BRUTON 15 puts forward the idea of a three-member presidency
for eighteen months; he also calls for improved public access to
Council documents.
- KORHONEN proposes a presidency `by team', regarding the
number of compositions of the Council as excessive.
- BARRAU 27 proposes dissociating the presidency of the
European Council and the presidency of the Council of Ministers,
establishing a collective presidency of the Council and creating a
Foreign Affairs Council, as well as introducing a Community Affairs
Council which would be assigned a general coordination mission and
would be responsible before Parliament.
- ATTALIDES 13 also calls for the Council, when acting as a
legislative body, to meet at least partly in public. DUFF-LAMASSOURE-
DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-KAUFMANN-ZIELENIEC-BERÈS40 call for open law-making
and the publication of how ministers vote in Council.
- HAIN 26 suggests that a broad agenda to which all
institutions subscribe (including the aims, principles and
constraints governing a particular policy area) be set.
- According to BÖSCH 24 there should be 3 Councils in the 2nd
and 3rd pillars:
· The European Council - 6 monthly rotating presidency should
be retained, concentration on core function of strategic political
planning,
· CFSP Council - made up of Foreign and Defence Ministers,
principle of constructive abstention to be retained, all external
policy competences within the Commission should be removed, the
Secretary-General should chair the CFSP Council without the right to
vote, the military capabilities of the EU should be strengthened,
national parliaments should have the final decision on whether to
employ military forces,
· JHA Council - made up of Home Secretaries and Justice
Ministers, chaired by a General Secretary without the right to vote,
concentration on fighting terrorism and organised crime and the
establishment of border police.
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 proposes that the Council should have the right
to call European Parliament elections if the European Parliament
dismisses the Commission. The Legislative Council should become a
second chamber. GAC should be separated into the Council of European
Affairs and the Council of Foreign Policy. Meetings of the
Legislative Council should be public.

10.4 Commission

- BRUTON 15 points out that a strong Commission is probably
the best means of guaranteeing the protection of the interests of
smaller Member States; with this in mind, the President of the
Commission should be elected by universal suffrage, provided that
his powers are increased (casting vote, right to appoint additional
commissioners, right to dismiss commissioners) and his independence
more effectively guaranteed (in particular by making his term of
office non-renewable).
- IDRAC 5 also argues in favour of electing the head of the
executive, whether the President of the Commission or another
person, by universal suffrage.
- TEUFEL 8, BELOHORSKA-BROK-DUFF-DUHAMEL-GLOTZ-KAUFMANN-
KILJUNEN-VAN DER LINDEN-MIERLO-ROSSA-TIMMERMANS-VASTAGH-AVGERINOS-
DINI-FAYOT-HÄNSCH-LAMASSOURE-MARINHO-SANTER-SZAJER-WITTBRODT-BALAZS-
DE GUCHT-HAMZIK-KAVAN-VAN LANCKER-MEYER-OLEKSY-TEUFEL-KUNEVA-
ALTMAIER-PACIOTTI-SPINI-BERÈS-KAUPPI-NAGY-PLEUGER-BERGER-RACK-SENFF-
WUERMELING36 considers that its President should be elected by the
EP or in connection with the European elections. La contribution des
socialistes du PE48 va dans le même sens.
- SEVERIN 9 considers that its executive powers should be
strengthened.
- BARRAU 27 and MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11 consider that all
executive powers should be conferred on it and that comitology can
be simplified.
- ATTALIDES 13 is in favour of having one Commissioner from
each country.
- BÖSCH 24 would prefer the present method for nominating the
Commission and its President to be retained; the Commission should
not have the right to dissolve the European Parliament; there should
be one Commissioner from each Member State; there should be no
competence for external policy in the Commission.
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 wishes to see the Commission elevated to the
central governing body with an enhanced role in setting the agenda
of the European Council and the election of the Commission President
by the European Parliaments President. Candidates should be
nominated by the European parties. The President should choose his
own commissioners, whose number must not be fixed. The election must
be approved by a Council majority. The Commission should retain the
exclusive right of initiative.
- BERGER38 considers the Commission should have the exclusive
right of initiative, should not, however, be able to pass autonomous
general legislation as is now the case for competition law.
- La contribution des socialistes du PE48 met par ailleurs
l'accent sur le regroupement sous l'égide de la Commission de toutes
les agences européennes et d'Europol.

10.5 Court of Justice

- TEUFEL 8 considers that the introduction of a European
constitutional appeal procedure is justified. SEVERIN9 calls for a
European Constitutional Court with regional and national branches.
- DUFF 3 and FARNLEITNER 19 consider that citizenship includes
the right to appeal to the Court of Justice when one is affected by
an act of the Union.
- La contribution de la délégation des socialistes du PE48 ne
défend le recours direct que pour le cas de violation des droits
fondamentaux reconnus par la charte.
- KAVAN 14 and SEVERIN9 also calls for more direct access to
the ECJ.
- DUFF-LAMASSOURE-DUHAMEL-DE GUCHT-KAUFMANN-ZIELENIEC-BERÈS40
suggest that judicial checks on the Constitution be supplemented by
the right to issue an injunction and Art. 230 reviewed to make these
checks available to a wider range of parties. The purview of the
Court should extend across the whole of EU competence.

10.6 Divers

- MUSCARDINI47 propose l'institution dans chaque État membre
d'un vice-médiateur.

11. Instruments

11.1 Hierarchy of norms

- TILIKAINEN 16, BRUTON 15 , BERGER38 and IOAKIMIDIS 6
(focusing on the need to simplify the Treaty) call for a clearer
distinction between the Union's legislative and executive powers and
would therefore seem to favour a hierarchy of norms; IDRAC 5 also
raises the issue of distinguishing between legislative norms and
implementing norms, as well as the need to clarify the way in which
legislative and executive duties are to be exercised; MICHEL-DE
GUCHT-DI RUPO 11 consider such a hierarchy to be essential.
- BARRAU 27 believes that a hierarchy of norms must be
established and considers this to be an aspect of simplification.
- DUFF 3 proposes a new typology of acts, which implies
recognition for a hierarchy of norms.
- HAIN 26 distinguishes 3 types of actions: Regulations, which
require no further implementing legislation at national level,
Framework-setting Directives, which set a broad objective leaving
Member States to decide how to deliver, and Non-binding means such
as target setting and peer pressure; commitology is too opaque.
There should be more scrutiny of implementation measures by elected
representatives.
- DINI 23 says that there is no need to make the various types
of instrument correspond rigidly to the various competences. In his
opinion, it is the institution which has the power of initiative -
the Commission - that should select the appropriate instrument
within the context of a hierarchy of clarified norms.
- IOAKIMIDIS 6 believes instruments could be limited and more
use made of framework legislation, open coordination and mutual
recognition.
- BERGER38 calls for a unified system of instruments in all 3
pillars. Regulations should be renamed "European Laws", Directives
should be renamed "European Framework Laws". More use should be made
of technical norms rather than Directives.

11.2 Typology of instruments

- MICHEL-DE GUCHT-DI RUPO 11 suggest improving coordination
procedures: the relevant political principles would be adopted by
the Council, acting by a qualified majority following consultation
of the European Parliament; the monitoring of implementation would
be based on a multilateral evaluation procedure.
- DINI 23 considers, with regard to the CFSP, that excessively
general `common strategies' have not proved useful. Two innovations
are essential with regard to CFSP instruments: use of QMV for common
positions and a single representative to international bodies. With
regard to home affairs and justice, framework decisions should be
abandoned in favour of directives which can be adopted by QMV and
decisions with direct effect. Conventions are obsolete.

12. Simplification

- BERÈS-HÄNSCH 2 argue in favour of radical simplification not
only of the text of the Treaty and Community procedures, but also of
European 'terminology'.

13. Organisation of the Convention's business

13.1 Duration of the Convention's work:

- NAHTIGAL 7 calls for an extension.

13.2 Information - communication with citizens

- LAMASSOURE 30 proposes sending a questionnaire out to all
citizens.

13.3 Applicant states

- Some, such as NAHTIGAL 7, call for full participation in the
Convention's decision-making procedure.

13.4 Working groups

- IDRAC 5 considers that working groups on subsidiarity and
the CFSP should be set up.
- DE GUCHT-DUFF-DEWAEL39 call for a working group on regions
with legislative competences and suggest the questions which should
be discussed in this group.