by Wouter Coussens (KIIB-IRRI) and Ben Crum (CEPS).

Two days after the Franco-German proposal for a double-presidency of the EU and four days before the Convention will start its debate on the EU institutions, Wouter Coussens and Ben Crum publish a systematic analysis of the options and guidelines for reform of EU-leadership. Attached you find links to the full Working Paper as well as to a summary of it.
We argue that the reorganisation of EU leadership faces three challenges: it needs to make the Union more effective, contribute to its democratic character and respect the Union's institutional balance. In view of these three challenges, we consider the various options raised along the two main strands of debate that touch upon the issue of leadership in the EU: first, the debate on the election of the Commission President and, secondly, the different proposals for reforming the Council Presidency.

Our findings lead us to recommend a model that secures efficacy by merging the Presidencies of the European Council and the Commission; democratises this position by having its holder elected directly by the people or by a Congress representing them; and secures the Union's institutional balance through appropriate accompanying measures.
We comment critically on the recent Franco-German compromise of sharing EU leadership between a permanent European Council President and an EP-elected Commission President. This proposal does reap (some of) the efficiency gains attributed to a permanent European Council President, complementing it with a genuine democratic improvement on the side of the Commission President. However, instead of overcoming the opposition between the intergovernmental and the community side of the Union, it entrenches this opposition in the organisation of leadership. The ensuing system will be even more liable to institutionalised conflict and deadlock than the present French semi-presidential system. The reformed European Council President will be deeply integrated within the structures of the European Council, while the Commission President is liable to be captured by the majority of the EP. The competition between the two Presidents is likely to do permanent damage to the Union's institutional balance.

http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/Executive%20summary%20CEPS-IRRI%20WP.PDF
http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/final%20version%20CEPS-IRRI%20WP.PDF